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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
RUTH ETHEL DRURY MARSHALL, 
et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
-vs.- Case No. 8792 
GEORGE T. TAYLER, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
PLAINTIFFS' PETITION FOR REHEARING 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In an action for personal injuries arising out of the 
alleged tortious act of defendant, the plaintiffs prevailed, 
upon a verdict of the jury and entry of judgment by the 
lower court. 
Upon appeal by defendant the verdict of the jury 
and the judgment of the lower court were reversed by 
this court in its decision filed July 7, 1958, and the plain-
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tiffs herewith petition this court for rehearing upon that 
decision. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The statement of facts as set forth in defendant's 
brief on appeal as modified by the statements of facts 
contained in the plaintiffs' brief on appeal is herewith 
incorporated in this Petition for Rehearing. 
STATE~1:ENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THIS COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE PLAINTIFFS 
TO HAVE BEEN CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLIGENT OR HAV-
ING ASSUMED THE RISK OF INJURY TO THEMSELVES 
IN THAT IT DID NOT CONSTRUE THE EVIDENCE IN 
THE MOST FA VO·RABLE LIGHT FOR PLAINTIFFS. FUR-
THERMORE, EVEN ASSUMING THAT PLAINTIFFS WERE 
GUILTY OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OR ASSUMP-
TION OF RISK ORIGINALLY, THE DEFENDANT HAD 
THE LAST CLEAR CI-IANCE TO A VOID INJURING PLAIN-
TIFFS AND, HAVING DISCOVERED THEM IN A POSITION 
OF PERIL, HE WAS UNDER A DUTY TO EXERCISE 
REASONABLE CARE FOR THEIR SAFETY. 
POINT II. 
BY ITS DECISION IN THIS CASE THE SUPREME 
COURT HAS USURPED THE FUNCTION OF THE JURY 
AND THE TRIAL COURT CONTRARY TO LA"\\T. 
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ARGU~IENT 
POINT I. 
THIS COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE PLAINTIFFS 
TO HAVE BEEN CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLIGENT OR HAV-
ING ASSUMED THE RISK OF INJURY TO THEMSELVES 
IN THAT IT DID NOT CONSTRUE THE EVIDENCE IN 
THE MOST FAVORABLE LIGHT FOR PLAINTIFFS. FUR-
THERMORE, EVEN ASSUMING THAT PLAINTIFFS WERE 
GUILTY OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OR ASSUMP-
TION OF RISK ORIGINALLY, THE DEFENDANT HAD 
THE LAST CLEAR CHANCE TO AVOID INJURING PLAIN-
TIFFS AND, HAVING DISCOVERED THEM IN A POSITION 
OF PERIL, HE WAS UNDER A DUTY TO EXERCISE 
REASONABLE CARE FOR THEIR SAFETY. 
This court is charged with the responsibility of con-
struing the evidence in a case upon appeal most favorably 
to the successful party in the lower court. Thompson v. 
Aldrich, 5 U.2d 99, 297 P.2d 226; Pantages v. Arge, 1 
U.2d 105, 262 P.2d 745; 5 C.J.S., Appeal and Error, § 
157 4. This the court did not do in this case. Quite to the 
contrary, this court has concluded that the plaintiffs could 
have released their holds on the door handles of defend-
ant's automobile during that split second when the auto-
mobile was necessarily stopped in changing from a weav-
ing reverse direction to a weaving forward movement. 
This conclusion has been reached in direct opposition 
to the plaintiffs' claim, amply supported by four witness-
es, that the plaintiffs were knocked from their feet by 
the defendant's sudden "\Veaving backward thrust and 
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were dragged backward in such a manner as to be unable 
to regain their balance. The instantaneous forward move-
ment of the automobile did not afford the plaintiffs an 
opportunity to regain their balance such that they would 
be in a position to let go of the car handles and remove 
themselves from the danger of falling under the wheels 
of the automobile. (Tr. 121-122, 161-162, 262-263, 281-282). 
The medical testimony of the attending physician corro-
borated the statement of witnesses that the plaintiff Mrs. 
Tayler suffered cuts and bruises to her knees and toes 
and that both feet ha~ abrasions with foreign matter 
ground into them which was present on the top portion 
of the instep of the foot and the toes. (Tr. 216). Mr. 
Marshall testified that he observed the flesh was torn 
from her knee with gravel ground therein and that both 
toe nails had been torn off with the flesh ground away 
to the bone. ( Tr. 129). Tlris testin1ony itself is absolutely 
indicative of the fact that :Nlrs. Tayler \Vas dragged by 
the automobile and was not attempting to stop the auto's 
movement. The injuries to the upper parts of the toes 
and knees are conclusive in corroborating the testimony 
that these plaintiffs were knocked fron1 their feet and 
literally dragged by the defendant's auton1obile. _._.\nd it is 
equally as certain that these plaintiffs could not have 
arighted the1nselves or disengaged then1selves from the 
car without risking nnnlediate death fronl the \\reaving 
wheels of the auto1nobile 'vhether in its bark,vard or for-
ward 1notion, or even in that frag1nentary split second 
in which, pursuant to the la"T of physies~ this 1nodern car 
may have stopped in its baclnvard motion in order to 
proceed forward. This conclusion 'vas reached by the 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
5 
trial judge and jury with a first hand knowledge of the 
testimony. Furthermore, it is apparently conceded by 
this court that no error was made in the instructions to 
the jury upon contributory negligence and assumption of 
risk. Under these circumstances, this court is obligated 
to construe the evidence most favorably to the plaintiffs, 
and such a construction would most certainly require an 
affirmation of the lower court's judgment. 
The court, as part of its opinion, states that "Mr. 
Marshall admitted that the car backed up and stopped be-
fore going forward." Actually he testified upon cross 
examination as follows (Tr. 142-143): 
"Q. Now when the car got down here, and stopped 
for a minute before it went forward-
A. I did not see it stop, no. 
Q. Well were you watching all the time~ 
A. I told it. I said before because of the dust, I 
could not see it come to a full stop." 
Thus it is clear beyond question that Mr. Marshall admit-
ted the car stopped as a function of physical inertia, BUT 
HE DID NO'T SEE THE CAR STOP BECAUSE HE 
WAS PREVENTED FROM SO DOING BY THE 
CLOUD OF DUST RAISED BY THE AUTOMOBILE'S 
UNUSUAL AND RECKLESS MOVEMENT. (Tr. 121-
122). Be that as it may, Mrs. Tayler testified as follows: 
"I had hold of the handle, and it swept me off 
my feet. Before I could get my bearings, he went 
back and forth, he weaved, I could not let go, I 
would have been run over .... Yes, it all happened 
so fast, like I said, he started with a jerk, and 
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weaved to the side, I lost my balance, and then he 
weaved to the other side, he backed up, at no time 
d~d he stop to my recollection, he never stopped. 
He came forward weaving back and forth. I could 
not let go, I would have gone under one of the 
wheels if I had of. All of a sudden, I hit an ob-
ject." (Emphasis added.) (Tr. 161-162.) 
In all sincerity, and with due respect to this Honor-
able ·Court, after examining and re-examining the record 
and the law, we find it impossible to reconcile the same 
with the decision of this Court. Instead of construing 
the evidence in the most favorable light for the plaintiffs, 
(the prevailing parties) as the law uniformly requires, 
and as justice and the needs of society dictate, this Court 
has construed the evidence most favorably to, and in 
entire accord with the contentions of the defendant. 
FURTHERMORE, even assuming that the plaintiffs 
were contributorily negligent or had assumed the risk 
of injury to themselves by not letting loose of the door 
handles at the moment this court considered most ap-
propriate, still this court was in error in not sustaining 
the judgment of the loV\rer court upon the doctrine of last 
clear chance or the rule that, after discovery of the peril 
brought on by one's o'V"Il trespass, contributory negli-
gence or assun1ption of risk, the person in charge of the 
instrumentality causing the dan1age is then duty-bound 
to exercise reasonable care and caution for the safety 
of such a one. It is a 'vell estabished rule, recognized in 
practically every jurisdiction, and variously referred to 
as "the doctrine of the last clear chance," "the humanitar-
ian doctrine," and "the doctrine of discovered peril," that 
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there may be a recovery for injuries sustained, notwith-
standing plaintiff negligently exposed himself or his 
property to the danger from which the injury complained 
of arose, if defendant failed to exercise ordinary care 
to avoid the injury after becoming aware that the person 
was in a position of peril. See voluminous lists of author-
ity in 65 C.J.S., Negligence, § 136. See also Beckstrom v. 
WiJlliJams, 3 U.2d 210, 282 P.2d 309; Theurer v. Holland 
Furnace Company, C.C.A. Utah, 124 F. 2d 494; Lawrence 
v. Bamberger R. Co., 3 U.2d 247, 282 P.2d 335; Compton 
v. Ogden Union Ry. & Depot Co., 120 U. 453, 235 P.2d 
515; Wines v. Rio Grande W. Ry. Co., 9 U. 228, 33 P. 
1042; Everett v. Oregon S. L. Ry. Co., 9 U. 340, 34 P. 289; 
Hall v. Ogden City Street Ry. Co., 13 U. 243, 44 P. 1046; 
TBakle v. San Pedro, L.A. & S. L. R. Co., 32 U. 276, 90 P. 
402; Knutson v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 78 U. 145, 2 
P.2d 102. 
In the Beckstrom case, supra, this court held: 
"The general principle of the last clear .chance 
doctrine has been accepted in Utah from early 
times and is firmly established in our law. Its most 
obvious appli,cation is in cases where the plaint~ff 
is in inextricable peril. * * *" (Emphasis added.) 
The facts of this case make the application of the rule 
most obvious. Even assuming that the plaintiffs were 
contributorily negligent or had assumed the risk of in-
jury to themselves by not releasing the door handles at 
the time the automobile concluded its backward motion, 
there can be no question that defendant was thereafter 
aware of their presence on the automobile and was aware 
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of their peril as he proceeded forward. The weaving and 
zigzagging previously referred to was aimed directly at 
dislodging the plaintiffs from their precarious positions 
in being dragged while holding the door handles of the 
automobile. Furthermore, it was testified on behalf of 
plaintiffs that there was no reason for defendant to drive 
under the canopy of the service station. (Tr. 151, 163-
164). The fact that one plaintiff was slammed against a 
cola vending machine and the other against a gas pump 
as a result of this choice of direction by defendant is too 
far outside the reahn of chance to have been accidental. 
The defendant himself testified that the plaintiffs were 
hanging on to his car handles (Tr. 335, 336). He also 
testified "I looked to the. side of me, and it seemed to me, 
I saw Fern drop off." (Tr. 295). Also, "I saw Ruth's 
head bouncing up and down" (Tr. 295), and "I pulled 
along and I kept on going, until Ruth finally saw I was 
going, and she let go, and when she did, I knew she had 
made a mistake." (Tr. 296). 
The defendant therefore admits that he was aware 
of the peril of plaintiffs after he proceeded forward. He 
further states that when Mrs. Marshall finally did let go 
of the car handles, he "knew she had made a mistake." 
Thus even the defendant recognized that her choice left 
little but disaster for her, by implying that she would 
have made a wiser choice by continuing to hold on to the 
door handle as the defendant headed for the open road 
at full throttle. 
There can be no doubt that this case is classically 
adapted to the "obvious application" of the last clear 
chance doctrine, and this court erred in not so holding. 
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In our appeal brief we brought to the court's atten-
tion a recent Florida case similar to the one at bar, with 
facts even more detrimental to the prevailing plaintiffs 
than in this case. In that case, Byers v. Gunn, 81 So. 2d 
723, the defendant's minor daughter, while driving her 
father's automobile, had stopped at a stop street. Four 
youngsters, including the plaintiff, approached the car 
and asked for a ride, which was refused. The daughter 
rolled up the windows and locked the doors, whereupon 
the four intruders sat down on the front fenders and hood 
of the car. The driver started the car in motion and, after 
attaining speeds up to 40 miles per hour, stepped on the 
brake causing the plaintiff to be thrown off and severely 
injured. The Supreme Court of Florida, affirming the 
lower court, allowed the plaintiff to recover upon aver-
dict of negligence. In so holding the court stated: 
"The injured girl was a trespasser and the 
trial judge so informed the jury. The rule of law 
is clear that the standard of care owed to a tres-
passer is to refrain from committing a willful or 
wanton injury. This rule, however, gives way to 
the further proposition that after discovery of the 
peril to a trespasser, the driver of the automobile 
is then duty-bound to exercise reasonable care and 
caution under the circumstances. Absent contri-
butory negligence on the part of the injured per-
son there would appear to be no justifiable excuse 
for injuring a person in a position of manifest 
peril if such injury can be reasonably avoided, or 
as otherwise stated, if such injury can be avoided 
by the exercise of reasonable care and caution 
in the light of all the circumstances in the particu-
lar case." 
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The court further held in thiJs case that vt could not be 
concluded as a matter of law that the plaintiff was guilty 
of contributory negligence or assumption of risk, and that 
the court w~as not justifi,ed in substituting iJts judgment 
forthatofthejury. 
The above authorities are unanimously in accord 
with the decision of the lower court in this case, and we 
feel that a fair interpretation of the facts as introduced 
at the trial, even without the indulgence of this court in 
viewing the evidence most favorably for plaintiffs as it is 
required to do, would lead this court to the inevitable 
conclusion that its previous decision was contrary to law 
and fact. 
POINT II. 
BY ITS DECISION IN THIS CASE THE SUPREME 
COURT HAS USURPED THE FUNCTION OF THE JURY 
AND THE TRIAL COURT CONTRARY TO LAW. 
It is elemental that questions as to the credibility, 
weight, and value of evidence are primarily for the jury 
and secondarily for the trial court, and, in the absence of 
a clear abuse of discretion, are not, on appeal, a matter 
for review. A verdict approved by the trial court, if 
without legal error and supported by the evidence, is con-
clusive on appeal. The general rule is that the appellate 
court cannot invade the province of the jury with respect 
to determining the facts, and the verdict of the jury as 
dependent on the evidence is ordinarily taken as conclu-
sive on the appellate court. 5A C.J.S., Appeal & Error, 
§§ 1647, 1653, and cases therein cited. Likewise the gen-
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eral rule precluding interference by the appellate court 
with a fact determination of the jury supported by evi-
dence applies with respect to findings in regard to as-
sumption of risk, or as to contributory negligence in ac-
tions based on negligence. Thus in the case of Malizia 
v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 53 U. 122, 178 P. 756, the 
court held that even though it might entertain doubts as 
to whether the conduct of plaintiff's decedent in passing 
in front of defendant's engine in going over a public 
crossing was excusable, yet it must yield to the judgment 
of the jury. See also Byers v. Gunn, supra. 
There can be no question that there was ample evi-
dence by plaintiffs' witnesses upon which the jury could 
find that there was no contributory negligence by plain-
tiffs. The jury found that the defendant did not use due 
care for the safety of plaintiffs (R. 83, 86) and that plain-
tiffs did not assume the risk of injury to themselves 
(R. 84, 88), nor were they contributorily negligent (R. 
84, 87). The trial court entered judgment accordingly. 
It is manifestly unjust and contrary to law for this 
Court to have usurped the function of the jury in this 
case. One might ask why there was any need of a jury or 
the trial court proceedings at all in this action. An appel-
late court never sees or hears \vitnesses, knows nothing 
of their demeanor, which is frequently a determining 
factor as to their credibility, and can determine facts 
only on the basis of the cold written word. In the absence 
of error of law, on the part of the trial court or the jury, 
in eliciting testimony, is there any basis, in la-vv or reason, 
upon which an appellate court can properly set itself as 
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a trier of facts and substitute itself for the jury~ It 
appears to us that this Court has done just that. 
This Court did not recite one single error of law in 
its decision. It does not question the sufficiency of the 
lower court's instructions as to any material matter. The 
opinion states in one breath that there can be no argument 
with the jury's findings as to wilfulness or wantonness 
on the part of the defendant (a point in favor of defend-
ant) and then promptly breathes the kiss of death upon 
the verdict and judgment of the jury as to the questions 
of contributory negligence and assumption of risk by 
substituting its own judgment for that of the jury on 
these matters. This we say it cannot, or should not, do in 
accordance with the established rules of law in these 
particulars. 
CONCLL~SION 
If our argument herein appears to be unusually 
vigorous, it should not be taken as anything but a sincere 
conviction of the correctness of our position, coupled 
with a realization that, at times, even Supreme Court 
Justices may be in error. If our position is correct, \Ye 
feel assured that this Court \\ill rectify the error and 
reverse its former decision, even though to do so may 
necessitate further deter1nination of other 1natters of la\Y 
in order to conclude this action. 
In our humble opinion, this Court's present determin-
ation of factual n1atters violates four eoncepts of la\\~, as 
follows: 
(1) It is not sustained by the "~eight of the en-
denee, as "'"as the ,Jury's finding. 
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(2) It is not based upon a construction of the evi-
dence most favorable to the plaintiffs who 
prevailed in the lower court. 
(3) It does not recognize the doctrine of last clear 
chance or discovered peril. 
(4) It usurps and invades the province of the 
JUry. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROMNEY & NELSON 
DONN E. CASSITY 
JACK L. CRELLIN 
Attorney$ for Respondents. 
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